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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

BANKRUPTCY- MuNlClPAL REORGANIZATION -

[ Vol. 39

FAIRNESS OF PLAN -

A local government district, finding itself hopelessly in debt, filed a petition for
relief under Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act as amended.1 The municipal
debt composition plan provided that bondholders would receive eight cents on
the dollar. The evidence showed that a considerable quantity of bonds were
bought by local landowners at much more than eight cents on the dollar, evidently for the purpose of being used in getting the approval of some such plan
as proposed, in the expectation of an increase in value of their lands by improvements to be made by the debtor through a loan from the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation. The plaintiff bondholders opposed adoption of the plan
on the ground of discrimination in favor of those holders who also owned land
in the district. Held, the plan discriminated against bondholders not owning land
in the district; the landowning bondholders should either have been excluded
from participation in determining the requisite percentages of assenting bondholders, or else there should have been a separate classification whereby those
creditors owning no lands could have voted and been recorded as such. Kaufman County Levee Improvement District No. 4 v. Mitchell, (C. C. A. 5th,

1941) u6 F. (2d) 959.
The approach of the courts to the question of fairness of plan in municipal
reorganizations has been greatly influenced by their experience with equity
receiverships and reorganization of private corporations under section 77 B
and now under Chapter X of the present Bankruptcy Act.2 In the field of corporate reorganization, the question of fairness has resolved itself mainly into one

1 50 Stat. L. 654, §§ 81-83 (1937), as amended by 52 Stat. L. 939, § 3 (a)
(1938), I I U. S. C. {Supp. 1939), §§ 401-404. Sec. 83 {e), I I U. S. C. (Supp.
1939), § 403 (e), provides, in part: "At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge shall
make written findings of fact and! his conclusions of law thereon, and shall enter an
interlocutory decree confirming the plan if satisfied that (1) it is fair, equitable, and
for the best interests of the creditors and does not discriminate unfairly in favor of
any creditor or class of creditors.•••" This provision stands in the amendments of 54
Stat. L. 44 and 668 (1941).
2 27 CAL. L. REv. 740 at 741 (1939); American United Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. City of Avon Park, (U. S. 1940) 61 S. Ct. 157, noted in 54 HARV. L. REv. 690
(1941); 27 VA. L. REv. 544 (1941); MooRE, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 437, 578
(1939).

RECENT DECISIONS

of maintaining "relative" or "absolute" priorities between the various classes of
creditors and stockholders.8 Thus, bankruptcy courts were committed to a strict
rule of equality between creditors before the problem arose under the municipal
composition section of the act 4 and this principle was adopted by Congress in
Chapter IX by the express provision against unfair discrimination.11 Because there
has been very little litigation under Chapter IX or its predecessors 6 on the q\leStion what constitutes a "fair and equitable plan"fortheprotection of the interests
of creditors in a composition agreement, 7 the very recent Supreme Court ruling
in American Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. City of Avon Park 8 and the decision in the principal case are of great importance in indicating the tests for the
validity of a municipal debt composition. In the Avon Park case, the action of a
.fiscal agency in securing approval of a municipal composition without disclosing
various pecuniary interests of its own 9 was severely criticized by the Supreme
Court in reversing the lower court's approval of the plan. The Court made it
clear that there is responsibility in a bankruptcy court to scrutinize carefully the
circumstances surrounding the acceptances, the special or ulterior motives which
may have induced them, the time of acquiring the claims so voting, and the
amount paid therefor. "Where such investigation discloses the existence of unfair
dealing, a breach of fiduciary obligations, profiting from a trust, special benefits
for the reorganizers, or the need for protection of investors against an inside
8 In the case of Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 33 S. Ct. 554
(1913), the Supreme Court adopted a rule to the effect that a reorganization plan was
fair if the "relative" priority between the various classes of creditors and stockholders
was maintained. Subsequently a stricter "absolute" priority rule appears to be required
by the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, in Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. l (1939). The latter rule of strict
"absolute" priority was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the very recent case of
Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, (U. S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 675, where the
Court held that the "absolute" priority rule applies to reorganizations of solvent as
well as to insolvent corporations, and protects the interest as well as principal of bonds.
4 The idea of a fair plan in corporate reorganization as laid down in Northern
Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 33 S. Ct. 554 (1913), was carried over into the
field of bankruptcy reorganization. 27 CAL. L. REv. 740 at 741 (1939).
G Quoted in note 1, supra.
6 Prior to Chapter IX, a similar statute had been declared unconstitutional in
Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1, 298 U. S. 513, 56
S. Ct. 892 (1936), but the immediate predecessor of Chapter IX, called the Municipal
Debt Composition Act, 50 Stat. L. 653 at 654 (1937), II U. S. C. (Supp. 1939),
§§ 401-404, has been sustained by the Supreme Court. United States v. Bekins, 304
u. s. 27, 58 s. Ct. 8II (1938).
'American United Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, (U. S. 1940) 61
S. Ct. 157. For definitions of "fairness" under a similar provision in the previous
act, see In re Merced Irrigation District, (D. C. Cal. 1939) 25 F. Supp. 981; In re
Drainage District No. 2 of Ada County, Idaho, (D. C. Idaho, 1939) 28 F. Supp. 84.
8 (U. S. 1940) 61 S. Ct. 157.
9 The fiscal agency had three financial stakes in the composition: (1) the fee to
be collected from bondholders, (2) speculative position as to interest accruals bought at
a discount, (3) speculative profit as a result of refunding of bonds bought at default
prices.
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few or of one class of investors from the encroachments of another, the court
has ample power to adjust the remedy to meet the need." 10 The doctrines so
expounded by the Supreme Court were heavily relied upon by the circuit court
of appeals in the principal case in adjudging that the landowning bondholders
obtained an unfair and inequitable advantage over nonlandholding creditors of
the same class. This would seem to be a very justifiable application of general
reorganization bankruptcy principles. A composition should not be confirmed
where one creditor has obtained some special favor or inducement not accorded
to others.11 In determining whether there is discrimination among creditors,
courts of bankruptcy have not hesitated to probe the circumstances surrounding
the composition to see if inequality exists.12 If it be said that there is no express
authority for such action, it may be argued that the bankruptcy court is a court
of equity,13 and therefore in the exercise of its jurisdiction may grant or deny
relief upon the performance of a condition which will safeguard the public
interest.14 The limitation of the vote to the amount paid for securities,15 the
separate classifications of claimants,1 6 the complete subordination of some claims,17
indicate tjie range and power which a bankruptcy court may exercise in these
proceedings. A review of these cases leads one to the conclusion that municipal
reorganizers must look to the principles established for reorganizations under
Chapter X as well as to the cases under the municipal composition section in
determining "fairness" of a plan thereunder.
Kenneth J. Nordstrom

American United Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, (U.S. 1940) 61
157 at 162.
11 ln re Weintrob, (D. C. N. C. 1917) 240 F. 532; In re M. & H. Gordon, Inc.,
(D. C. N. Y. 1917) 245 F. 905. But a composition of debts of a drainage district is
not unfair for failing to give a first in time bond issue priority over subsequent issues
where all of the bondholders acquiesced in treating the bonds on a parity. Luehrmann
v. Drainage District No. 7 of Poinsett County, Arkansas, (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 104
F. (2d) 696, cert. denied sub nom. Haverstick v. Drainage District No. 7 of Poinsett
County, Arkansas, 308 U. S. 604, 60 S. Ct. 141 (1939).
12 National Security Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426, 53 S. Ct. 678 (1933); Case
v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. I (1939).
18 52 Stat. L. 842, § 2 (1938), II U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § II. See also American United Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, (U. S. 1940)' 61 S. Ct. 157.
14 Securities and Exchange Commission v. United States Realty & Improvement
Co., 310 U. S. 434, 60 S. Ct. 1044 (1940); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 60
S. Ct. 238 (1939).
15 ln re McEwen's Laundry, (C. C. A. 6th, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 872.
16 First National Bank of Herkimer v. Poland Union, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940)
109 F. (2d) 54.
11 Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307, 59 S. Ct. 543 (1939);
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 60 S. Ct. 238 (1939).
10

s. Ct.

